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Abstract 
Climate change is one of the priority issues on the current sustainability agenda and a 
malign type of problem (Gupta, 2010) with various conflicting interests that requires a 
collaborative solution. Public-private partnerships are a specific form of transformative 
governance as they provide linkages to more benign issues and therefore increase the 
problem solving capacity of the overall governance system. Three modalities of public-private 
partnerships are identified in this paper: instrumental, institutional and regime, characterized 
by specific inputs to climate governance and hence requiring different approaches to 
measuring their effectiveness. For instance, climate partnerships perceived from the 
instrumental perspective are frequently evaluated in terms of fulfilling the target or functions, 
while studies of the institutional modality of partnerships rely on assessment criteria derived 
from organizational science, which are mainly concerned with organisational capacities and 
operational accountability. Finally, studies on the overall climate regime (as a form of meta-
partnership) are often linked to questions of legitimacy and accountability. 
The paper analyses different approaches to measuring effectiveness of climate 
partnerships and proposes an assessment framework addressing variations of climate 
partnerships contributions within identified modalities. The proposed framework is based on 
three effectiveness standards, which allow assessing each modality of partnerships from 
various analytical perspectives established in conjunction with the type of partnership 
contribution, i.e. goal attainment, accountability, legitimacy. The study also provides 
comparison across the modalities in an attempt to understand competitive advantages of 
each modality and provide insights on which climate partnership modality delivers more 
tangible results for tackling climate change issues.  
1. Introduction 
According to Mayntz (2004:66), the notion of governance relies on the broad idea of 
multi-actor steering as in “totality of interactions in which government, other public bodies, 
private sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems or creating 
societal opportunities”. There are a variety of partnerships, which contribute to climate 
governance through the different means and functions implemented.  
The study makes and initial attempt to differentiate partnership categories (ontologies) 
by introducing three key modalities based on variations in partnerships’ structure, 
organizational approaches and orientation. The idea of classification remains a challenge due 
to ambiguity of partnerships as a concept, which is widely understood within specified 
narratives. The proposed classification is based on taxonomic approach deriving from 
empirically observable partnerships characteristics, which however presents a social construct 
relying on an individual perception. Therefore I have no intention to claim that modalities 
present definitive approach to partnership typologies. However, development of partnership 
typologies will support research on general understanding of partnerships, their competitive 
advantages as governance tools and partnerships’ role within climate governance.  
The study recognises various analytical discourses within the research on partnerships 
and is illustrative in terms of how lack of common definitions can deliver conflicting 
conclusions on partnership contribution and effectiveness to climate governance.  
Three partnerships modalities can be identified within climate governance arena, i.e. 
partnerships utilized as a governance instrument (Börzel and Risse, 2005; Runde and Wise, 
2011), partnerships as governance institutions or agents (Biermann and Siebenhuner, 2009) 
and partnerships as a form of governance regime (Kooiman, 2003; Klijan and Koppenjan, 
2000; Borzel and Risse, 2005; Meuleman, 2008; Andonova 2009B) with a potential to 
contribute to the most advanced form of steering - meta-governance (Meadowcroft, 2007).  
Each modality of partnerships is characterized by specific input to climate governance 
and hence approaches to measuring its effectiveness. Partnerships perceived from the 
instrumental perspective are frequently evaluated in terms of fulfilling the target or functions 
(OECD 2006, Leach et al 2002), studies of institutional modality of partnerships rely on 
assessments deriving from organisational science, which are mainly concerned with 
organisational capacities and operational accountability (Backstrand, 2006, Wettestad, 1995; 
Grant and Keohane, 2005; Gupta, 2010), studies on contribution of partnerships regimes are 
often linked with the extent of legitimacy (Ledered, 2011; Hahn and Pinkse, 2014; Backstand, 
2006; Kankaanpaa and Young, 2012). . 
The paper analyses different approaches to measuring effectiveness of climate 
partnerships and proposes an assessment framework addressing variation of partnership 
contributions within identified modalities. The proposed framework is based on three 
effectiveness standards, which allow assessing each modality of partnerships from various 
analytical perspectives. Each modality is assessed across three effectiveness standards, 
established in conjunction with the type of partnership contribution, i.e. goal attainment, 
accountability, legitimacy. The study also provides comparison across the modalities in an 
attempt to understand competitive advantages of each modality and provide insights on 
which modality delivers more tangible results for tackling specific environmental issues 
looking at the example of climate change.  
2. Methodology  
2.1 Analytical framework 
Attempts to differentiate partnerships have been made by a number of authors. For 
instance, Glasbergen (2007) distinguishes partnerships as collaborative arrangements, 
partnerships as governance mechanisms, partnerships as governance structures. Lehmann 
(2006:238) lists three levels of partnering based on the level of commitment and number of 
partners involved: (1) collaborative projects (2) learning systems (3) governance networks. 
Bakstrand (2007) categorises partnerships per functions implemented: advocacy, rule and 
standard setting, rule implementation and service provision. Von Malmberg (2003:142) 
distinguishes 3 types of partnerships based on their orientation, i.e.: sharing knowledge and 
experience, joint venture arrangements aiming at organisational capacity building, project 
implementation. Selsky and Parker (2005) list four different categories of the partnerships 
based on various combinations of involved actors, i.e. business-government, business-civil 
society, government – civil society and business-government-civil society. Sorensen and 
Torfing (2009) refer to the following types of multi-stakeholder arrangements: set from 
bottom up or top down, formal or informal, intra or inter organizational, open or closed, 
tightly knit or loosely coupled, short or long lived. Witte (2003) identifies three ideal types of 
networks:  negotiation,  coordination and implementation.   
The instrumental1 use of partnerships implies that partnerships are applied by certain 
actors for achieving specific outcomes.  Studies on partnerships as an instrument are 
frequently examined from the actors’ perspective implying that every partner represents a 
particular interest, comes with specific expectations and stands for its own rationality 
(McInerney, 2000). The contribution to this type of partnerships is actor specific and range 
from funding, market access and access to technology and specific knowledge from private 
partners to reach with the governments and expertise from public partners (Runde and Wise, 
2011). Partnerships created in conjunction of Kyoto Protocol within Clean Development 
Mechanism are regarded as innovative instrument for emission reductions involving both 
developed and developing countries (Streck 2004). In such a way partnerships created under 
CDM assist in implementation of the Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and aim at achieving 
cost-effective GHG emissions reductions at a chosen project locations. According to 
Bäckstrand (2007), most of the 673 registered CDM projects can be described as multi-
sectoral partnerships involving project investors (governments or private actors), multilateral 
institutions, non-profit organizations and carbon brokers and developing countries.  
																																																								1	The notion of instrument is based on Lascoumes and le Galès (2007:1)  definition – 
“a device that is both technical and social and organizes specific social relations”.  	
The institutionalised partnerships are examined in terms of the roles and functions they 
may fulfill in the global environmental governance regime (Huijstee et al, 2007). Among 
possible functions characterizing institutionally set partnerships are standard-setting and 
norm creations, knowledge dissemination/technology transfer, technical implementation, 
building institutional capacity and innovations (Glasbergen, 2001). Ward (2002) sees 
institutionally set partnerships as consciously designed structures chosen by individuals to 
produce stability, while the process of institutionalization with continuing process of 
negotiation among actors and capacity of these processes to serve the interests of actors 
seeking maximization of utility. Institutionally set partnerships have defined and centralized 
structures with the governing mechanisms in place (boards, steering committees etc). Within 
climate governance arena, this modality is distinctive in terms of implemented functions, 
scale of operations and regulative rules in place. Such partnerships as, REEEP, GWEP, WWEA, 
have established reporting system, product and service orientation, national/international 
level of operations, presence of accountability mechanisms and funding strategies. 
The studies on partnerships as regimes focus on inter-linkages among the single 
institutions, investigate how various partnerships interact with large international 
organisations and are embedded into governmental architectures and examine the issues 
related to network governance based on multi-actor involvement. Depending on type of 
linkages between the actors, Considine (2005) distinguishes 3 types of involvement: 
interorganisational networks (linking private and public actors), inter-actor networks (linking 
leaders and advocates) and inter-agency networks (linking various actors and agents in 
provision of services). The idea of regime formation can be linked to advantages delivering by 
such extended multi-actor structures which relate to: flexibility, openness to innovation, 
superior information and knowledge sharing capabilities Sorensen (2006). UNFCCC presents a 
top-down negotiated arrangement and based on close cooperation among various number of 
stakeholders. The process of development targets for GHGs emissions reductions required 
multi-stakeholder involvement in which the states had significant input on how the GHGs 
goals shall be met (Andresen et al 2014).  
The studies on all modes of partnerships outline. importance of organisational aspects 
(Andonova 2009A, Miles et al (2002), Andresen and Rosendal (2009) etc). The following 
common organizational issues can be identified:  
- Level of institutionalization vary from one mode to another and refers to extent 
of formalized rules, standards and mechanisms. Biermann and Siebenhuner (2009) 
claim that introduction of moderate bureaucratic mechanisms minimizes power 
asymmetries in complex relationship of multi-actor engagements. Although, over-
institutionalisation may considerably reduce flexibility of the partners and result in 
weak performance. (Glasbergen, 2007) 
- Degree of embedding into broader policy contexts (Andonova, 2009; Biermann et 
al, 2007B). It is worth noting, that instrumental mode has the highest degree of 
embedding as it can be used within two other modalities of partnerships (refer to the 
chapter on dichotomy for more details). Furthemore, institutionally set partnerships 
can be embedded within regimes as institutional component lies within any regime  
and many regimes are served and managed by an organization (Miles et al, 2002) 
- In terms of the structure, each mode of partnerships can be approached in 
accordance with Deutschman (1995), who distinguishes 5 organizational types 
including simple structure, machine beneficiary, professional bureaucracy, 
divisionalised form and adhocracy. Each type of structure is defined by regulative 
mechanisms which include mutual adjustment, direct supervision and standardization. 
Another factor is degree of specialization and formalization. The simple forms of 
multi-actor structures develop on partners mutual adjustment and adjust themselves 
through everyday communication. With growing scope of the agenda and programs, 
number of partners and increasing communication, partnerships need to introduce 
some standards for instance through formal organisation (setting boards of managers, 
advisory committees), communication standards (regular meetings, conference calls, 
meeting of partners and donors etc), products and services standards (projects 
appraisal criteria, monitoring and evaluation etc). 
- Orientation is defined by the objectives set within each multi-actor arrangement. 
For instance, each mode of partnerships can be specialized in different subject areas. 
For instance, EIA projects covering natural resources, transport and infrastructure. 
ENPI is specializing in environment, energy, gender and education. Also all the above 
mentioned modes can be policy or market oriented (Glasbergen et al, 2007). Policy 
oriented partnerships aim at regulatory changes, development, lobbying and 
adoption of political proposals. Market oriented partnerships strive towards 
development of products and services that meet market needs.  Young (1994)  
distinguishes between those focused on a single issue area and those whose 
concerns extend to broad spectrum of issues.  
- Partnerships can also be oriented towards and operate across different scales. Many 
authors (Biermann and Siebenhuner, 2009; Gupta, 2008, Rezessy et al, 2006; 
Bulkeley and Bestill 2003) note that responses to global challenges occur at various 
levels and require application of tailored governance approaches. 
- In terms of functional objectives, all modes of partnerships can do: consultancy, 
advocacy, information exchange, capacity building etc (OECD, 2006). Borzel and 
Risse (2010), suggests the following list of functions: rule and standard setting, rule 
implementation, service provision). Additionally, Glasbergen et al (2007) refers to 
raising awareness and technology transfer; Linder (1999) outlines moral regeneration, 
risk shifting, restructuring public service etc. Abbot and Snidal (2009) observe agenda 
setting, negotiation of standards, implementation, monitoring and enforcement. 
 
2.2 Partnership modalities 
The phenomenon of partnerships is discursively constructed by scholars and existing in 
many variations, which can only be understood within established narratives. Distinction of 
modes proposed in this paper is based on conceptualisation of dichotomy of each mode 
object/subject relation. Three partnership modalities can be distinguished in relation to their 
contribution for climate governance, i.e. partnerships as instruments, partnership as 
governance agents and partnerships as governance regimes. Each mode of partnerships can 
contribute to climate governance via aggregation of actors and acting as a whole (an 
independent formation), while the definition of actor can vary for each mode. The 
instrumental mode of partnerships is a process and aggregation of individual representatives 
of the participating organisations or communities. Partnerships as institution are a structure 
and an aggregation of actors represented by a limited number of individual organisations. 
Partnerships as regimes are an architecture which comprise a vast number of organisations 
and representatives.  
Additional ambiguity derives from the notion that in relation to the governance each 
mode can be seen as an instrument. Wurzel et al. 2013 state that a network could be 
regarded as a policy and governance instrument. Mert (2009) sees Type 2 partnerships 
instrumental for environmental governance, but nonetheless constructs the study around the 
notion of partnerships as “new governance institution”. Also partnerships can be instrumental 
for formation of regimes. Bauer et al. (2009) recognizes that regimes can be instruments or 
mechanisms in the hands of national governments but also as political actors in their own 
rights. Gehring (2004) notes that it is common in the research on effectiveness of the 
international regimes to consider a regime as an instrument established by interested actors 
to bring about change. Hovi (2004) claims that regimes can be used instrumentally to resolve 
conflicts via generation of mutually beneficial practices. 
Similarly, terminological challenges may arise in relation to the definition of institution. 
For instance, Young’s (Young, 1994) definition of an institute is based on functional 
contribution to the governance and allows variations in scale and organisational approach of 
the multi-actor arrangement, i.e micro-level (so called common pool resources arrangements), 
mezo-level and and macro-level (regimes).  Consequently, any of the defined modes of multi-
actor arrangements could be labeled as institution as long as they are contributing to defining 
social rules and presenting a code of conduct.   
Glasbergen (1998), Koch and Buser (2006) share concerns that dichotomy is essential 
part of governance concept, which may result in terminological challenges with inevitable 
overlapping of analytical frameworks. The overlapping zones are indicative in terms of 
possible transformation from one mode to another and appearance of hybrid arrangements. 
An assumption can be made that the borderline between instrumental and institutional 
modalities of partnerships could be identified in conjunction with shift in partnership’s 
functional objective from policy implementation to service provision, which subsequently 
requires organisational structure and standards as noted by Pattberg (2009). Once the 
functions are being extended and an organisation is becoming involved in rule-setting in a 
chosen issue area, expanding the network to include other powerful actors and upscale 
activities to the international level, one can assume that regime has appeared. Additionally, 
the key partnerships parameters related to structure, scale, orientation, representation, 
degree of centralisation and embedding could be indicative of distinction of partnership 
modalities. For instance, the border line between the instrumental mode and institutionalised 
mode could be drawn by change in structure from simple non-hierarchical to defined 
centralised structure, extent and quality of representation from limited and informal to 
extended and formal etc (Table 1). The regime is different from institutional and instrumental 
modes in terms of strictly international scale of operations in combination with complex non-
hierarchical structure and the most extended number and variety of partners. 































Number of actors Limited Medium Extended 
Orientation policy 
implementation 
service provision standard and rule setting 





Table 1. Overview of variations across partnerships modalities 
2.3 Effectiveness assessment framework 
There are a number of factors affecting partnership effectiveness. Effectiveness could be 
a function of some partnerships characteristics such as design (Ostrom 1990, Wettestad  
(1995), Sorensen and Torfing (2009) and structure (Young 1994, Levy et al 1996,  Lehman 
2006), representation (Lehmann 2006, von Malmborg 2003), scope (Ostrom, 1990, Chan  
and Muller, 2012)  and orientation (Keohane, 1993) and scale (Andonova 2009B, von 
Malmborg 2003).  
However, the factors affecting the performance of the partnerships are more or less 
understood, the notion of what should be considered as a benchmark of effective partnership 
is understandably not clear. Additional challenge is imposed by variety of partnerships types, 
each of which would have a different notion for effective performance. In line with this 
concern, Brinkerhoff (2009) suggests that a standard for measuring partnership effectiveness 
shall not be uniform but rather tailored to specific objectives of the partnerships. For instance, 
effectiveness can be measured as a problem solving capacity Miles et al (2002), goal 
achievement (Andresen and Rosendal, 2009), performance against implemented functions 
(Ivanova, 2009).  
a. Approaches to measuring partnership effectiveness  
The partnerships fitting the instrumental modality are a participatory process targeting policy 
levels with relatively limited number of parties involved, low standardisation of procedures 
and loosely defined structures. The instrumental use of partnerships implies that partnerships 
are applied by certain actors for achieving specific outcomes. Indeed, studies on partnerships 
as an instrument are frequently examined from the actors’ perspective implying that every 
partner represents a particular interest, comes with specific expectations and stands for its 
own rationality (McInerney, 2000).  
The concept of instrument implies a policy mechanism and efforts aimed at achieving the 
intentions of the policy makers (Bressers and O’Tolle, 1998). Therefore effectiveness in the 
case of an instrument can be measured in terms of the extent of achieving the target, which 
led to application of the instrument. In this sense, the instrumental effectiveness, i.e. extent 
of the problem solving capacity, is also valid for partnerships set as regimes (Dombrowsky 
2008, Skjarseth 1992,  Gehring 2004) and institutions, e.g. Johannesburg partnerships were 
instruments aimed at  implementing multilateral targets on climate and energy (Bäckstrand, 
2007).  
Institutional modality of partnerships must have a defined structure of an organisation, 
standardised procedures and at least the regional presentation. The institutional modality is 
distinctive in terms of organisational set, functions and contribution to climate governance. 
The partnerships of this mode are primarily understood as institutional arrangements 
contributing to the climate governance and examined in terms of the roles and functions they 
may fulfill (Huijstee et al, 2007). Among possible functions characterising institutionally set 
partnerships are standard-setting and norm creations, knowledge dissemination/technology 
transfer, technical implementation, building institutional capacity and innovations. 
(Glasbergen, 2001). Among other features of the institutionalised partnerships are 
established reporting system, product and service orientation, national/interational level of 
operations, presence of accountability mechanisms and funding strategies.  
Institutional perspective derives from the definition of the institution, which in this study 
is understood as a set organisation with a specified mandate, structure and a scale of 
operations. Studies of institutional effectiveness are frequently drawn on the organisational 
aspects (management approaches (Watson, 2001), organisational structures (Chan, 2012) 
and design (Sorensen and Torfing, 2009; Szulecki et al, 2012, Young, 2011). The other 
studies assess effectiveness from the various aspects of accountability which is analysed  
through the presence of funding mechanisms (Watson, 2001), monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks (Wettestad, 1995), elements of strategic planning (Gupta, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 
2007), extent of application of auditing and self-reporting, frequency and accessibility of 
disclosed information  (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). It’s 
worth mentioning that the concept of accountability is also applicable for partnership regimes 
as they can be seen as “international organisations created to administer the provisions of 
environmental governance systems” (Young 1994:175) or partnership instruments in case of 
partnerships that don't have an organisational status but take the form of a project (Szulecki 
et al 2012).  Therefore the institutionally effective partnership is an arrangement with a clear 
mandate regarding the roles and responsibilities and evidence of the programmatic planning 
with measurable targets, monitoring and evaluation framework and reporting with verifiable 
results.  
 Regime modality of partnerships are such mutli-stakeholder arrangements that have 
complex architectures, extended number of parties and are involved in standard and rule-
setting. As noted by Andresen and Rosendal (2009), regime is a form which has 
characteristics of  institution/organisation (i.e. structure, design), and also a norm-setting 
capacity. Miles and Underdal states that an institutional component is essential part of any 
regime (regimes are frequently managed by an organisation) and it affects the problem 
solving capacity of regime. Pattberg (2009) states that regime is as a result of continuous 
institutionalisation and creation of meta-structures governed through their own rules and 
regulations. Regime effectiveness approaches derive from the international relation theories 
(Backstrand, 2012) and are concerned with various aspects of decision making processes 
including transparency and legitimacy. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) suggest that in terms of 
effectiveness, regimes can be measured against their capacity to generate policy options 
based on high degree of legitimacy, whereas legitimacy denotes inherent capacity of a rule to 
encourage compliance and defines how an organisation acts and through who for achieving 
compliance (Hisschenuller  Gupta, 1999:160).  Legitimacy is frequently associated with 
inclusiveness (Ledered, 2011; Hahn and Pinkse, 2014; Backstrand, 2012; Dellas, 2012; 
Wettestad, 1995; Kankaanpaa and Young, 2013; Biermann et al 2012) and correlates with 
balanced representation of different stakeholder groups (Backstand, 2006). Participation lies 
in the very core of each modality of the partnerships (Visseren-Hamakers 2007) and is 
necessary for achieving broader sustainable development goals and increasing citizen 
empowerment (Della, 2012). Although, the concept of legitimacy is most frequently 
applicable to the studies of the international institutions and regimes with existing structures, 
participation is a concern for partnerships set as instruments (in a form of projects) within 
already existing structures (Leach et al,  2002;  Thackway and Olsson, 1999). Therefore, 
according to this analytical perspective, the effective partnership is a transparent and 
participatory arrangement (Michaelowa, 2012).  
b. Assessment Framework 
 The main question of the study is which modality of partnerships delivers more tangible 
results in terms of the goal attainment and presents more legitimate and accountable 
solutions for tackling the climate change issues. The study also attempts to provide cross–
comparison for three modalities of partnerships in terms of their effectiveness for tackling 
climate change issues and hence there is a need to introduce the indicators that would allow 
compatibility and common measures.  
 The assessment framework comprises a set of qualitative indicators that conceptualise the 
idea of effiective partnership (Table 2). The assessment represents a survey of the key 
partnership attributes across the main indicators: goal attainment, accountability, legitimacy 
and transparency. The survey is based on the content analysis, studies of the online 
resources, progress-reports, Annual CDM reports of the Executive Board to the Conference of 
the Parties, UNFCCC web-site, CDM database, and web-sites of REEEP, WWEA, GVEP and 
REN21.  
For each indicator the value ranges from Low to Medium and High. The value explains 
the degree to which the indicator has been met (based on analytical explanation).  
Effectiveness 
type 















Extent of meeting the target set 







 Accountability  Clarity of the 
mandate 
Presence of the documents that 




Presence of monitoring and 
evaluation framework in place 
and detailed reporting with 
quantitative and qualitative 









Presence of steering, advisory 
committees with balanced 
representation  




Evidence that civil society 
organisations provide legal 
representation, regularly facilitate 
or support the advocacy concerns 
of grassroots groups and 
vulnerable populations 
Transparency Public disclosure of 
documents:  
 
Documents made available to the 
committee are also made 
available to the public at the 
same time. This transparency will 
allow the public to gauge 
whether the committee’s findings 
were substantiated by available 
information or whether they were 
delivered without any such 
references. 
Table 2. Effectiveness assessment framework 
3. Analysis of effectiveness across three modalities of climate 
partnerships 
Climate change is one of the priority issues in sustainability agenda and a malign 
(Wettestad 1999, Hisschemoller and Gupta, 1999) type of problem with various conflicting 
issues, resolution of which requires a collaborative effort. Partnership incentives are essential 
for tackling climate change as they provide linkages to more benign issues and therefore 
increase a problem solving capacity (Hisschemoller and Gupta, 1999:195). Three modalities 
of partnerships can be observed within various segments of the issue area, i.e. CDM 
partnerships, institutionally set partnerships (REEEP, GVEP etc), larger partnership formed 
around UNFCCC..  
3.1 CDM partnerships 
The CDM projects are examples of partnership with high degree of public-private 
interactions (Duyck, 2011) that involve a diverse set of actors, such as project investors 
(governments or private actors), multilateral institutions, non-profit organisations, carbon 
brokers and developing countries (Bäckstrand 2007). CDM partnerships operations involve 
relatively small quantities of resources and limited number of partners. CDM partnerships are 
characterised by simple non-hierarchical structure (Table 3), which are assigned in line with 
CDM guidelines (Decision 3/CMP.9 Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, 
9/CMP.7 Materiality standard under the clean development mechanism, 10/CMP.7 Modalities 
and procedures for carbon capture and storage , Modalities and procedures for a CDM). CDM 
partnerships do not have centralised body or/and process for decision-making. The project 
implementors are solely in charge of decision-making. A limited number of partners are 
consulted for implementation purposes in a form of one-off contact established to achieve 
compliance with the requirements for CDM projects. CDM partnerships operations involve 
relatively small quantities of resources and number of partners.  






High  According to UNEP DTU CDM/JI Pipeline Database, CDM projects 
demonstrate various degrees of achievement of emissions 
reductions, depending on the type of project.2 On average 
performance of CDM projects in terms of the ratio of expected 
CERs to actually issued ones has remained high with 95‐100% 




High Strictly defined in line with modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism 4 and technical paper on issues relating 
to possible changes to the modalities and procedures for the CDM 
Reporting 
 
High  CDM has clear guidelines and standards for reporting on the 
progress of emissions reductions. According to CDM Standard5, 
the monitoring plan shall include: the operational and 
management structure to be put in place to implement the 
monitoring plan; Provisions to ensure that data monitored; 
Definition of responsibilities and institutional arrangements for 
data collection and archiving; accuracy level of measuring and 
measuring standards etc. 6. The frequency of reporting vary 
across 7621 registered projects, however on average one to two 





















CDM partnerships do not have a centralised body or/and process 
for decision-making. The project implementors are solely in 
charge of decision-making. A limited number of partners are 
consulted for implementation purposes in a form of one-off 
contact established to achieve compliance with the requirements 
for CDM projects. The project partners include: national 
governments, business firms, wider civil society. For instance, 
once the project is initiated by the investors, governments are 
consulted regarding Project Design Document (PDD) approval, 
which has to be endorsed by the national authority. According to 
CDM rule book,7 designated operational entities (DOEs), which is 
a private firm, is consulted for validation of the project, which 




ensuring that changes being made to address the comments. 
Additionally, DOE is in charge of validating the emission 




Medium  However, there is an established process for public consultation, 
i.e Global Stakeholder Process (GSP), the public engagement is 
frequently called as ‘ticking the box’ activity. Lack of standards 
affects the quality of consultation processes and there is evidence 
of poor engagement which resulted in validation of the projects 
with ineffective measures to provide affected communities with 
recourse, i.e. hydropower projects that include Stung Tatay 
(Cambodia); Panan (India); Santo Antõnio (Brazil); Jirau (Brazil); 
Teles Pires (Brazil); Kamchay (Cambodia) Marañon (Peru); Nam 
Ngum 5 (Lao PDR); Yunnan Gongguoqiao (China); Barro Blanco 
(Panama); and Bonyic (Panama)).8 
 
CDM partnerships prove to be effective instruments with high levels of accountability due 
to robust measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems.  From the regime 
perspective, CDM partnerships demonstrate medium legitimacy (due to decision-making 
being solely done by the project implementors and lack of enforcement for engagement of 
civil society) and medium levels of transparency.  
3.2  Institutionalised climate partnerships 
 Institutionalised climate partnerships have defined and centralised structures with the 
governing mechanisms in place (boards, steering committees etc). The partners are diverse 
and measured in hundreds. Collaborations among partners rely on varied methods through 
project implementation, funding, information exchange etc.  
The following partnerships of the institutional modality have been chosen: REEEP, GVEP, 
WWEA, REN21. Table 1 shows the criteria used for selection of cases, i.e. all of the above 
partnerships are formalized as organisations, have network of partners with established rules 
for joining, centralised structure and are oriented towards service provision, while operating 
and the international level. All of the selected partnerships have a mandate to tackle climate 
change, however the methods of tackling, services and approaches to membership vary. 
Therefore, selection is made to reflect variations within institutional modality and with 
																																																								8	http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/submission-regarding-human-rights-to-the-cdm-7899	
consideration of data accessibility issues. All of the above partnerships have well established 
reporting systems and regularly published performance reports.   
It’s worth mentioning that despite the main commonality (being an institutionally set, 
open end partnerships aiming at mitigation of the climate change), the partnerships present 
substantial variations in terms of scope, actor representation and membership policies. 
In terms of membership, REN21, and WWEA are conditionally open institutions. REEEP 
and GVEP are not accepting partners’ applications at the moment, but both used to be 
conditionally open. As for specialization, REN 21 and WWEA are advocacy and information 
generating partnerships, GVEP and REEEP are oriented towards policy implementation 
(Johannesburg Plan) and advocacy.  
REEEP invests in clean energy markets in developing countries to reduce CO2 emissions 
through a strategic portfolio of the projects. GVEP (Global Village Energy Partnership) works 
with local businesses in developing countries to increase access to modern energy and to 
improve the quality of lives for millions of people. WWEA is an international non-profit 
association embracing around 100 countries and working for the promotion and worldwide 
deployment of wind energy technology. REN21 promotes renewable energy to meet the 
needs of both industrialised and developing countries that are driven by climate change, 
energy security, development and poverty alleviation. 
REEEP 
Goal attainment Low Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers 
concluding on the goal attainment. Only 6 percent of 
projects supported by REEEP resulted in direct 
reduction of emissions, while the majority of projects 
relate to capacity building measures (Parthan et al, 
2010). 
Clarity of the 
mandate 
High Partners roles and responsibilities, organs of REEEP, 
function of the meeting of partners, governing board, 
international secretariat are defined by Statues9 
Reporting 
 
Low Quantitative reviews of the progress are available only 
for the projects being implemented. Progress reports 
are based on descriptive analysis with qualitative 
assessments which are subjective and difficult to verify.  






















Partnership is comprised of 385 member organisations. 
These include businesses, NGOs, industry associations, 
financial institutions and other civil society entities, as 
well as 45 national governments.10 REEEP engages with 
a limited number of partners using joint-decision 
making via the Programme Board, which proposes 
longer-term programme priorities and oversees the 
monitoring and evaluation process. The Board is 
comprised of one representative from each of the 
regions covered by REEEP Programs, up to five donor 
representatives (represented by governments and 
business), one representative from an international 
NGO, and two representatives from business. 
Public 
consultations 
Low Mechanism for public consultation is not available 
 
GVEP 
Goal attainment High  Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers 
concluding on the goal attainment. The website refers to 
4.3 million tons of CO2 being avoided (implying that 
projects enabled GHG emissions to be avoided by the 
third parties) through the implemented projects, 
however there is no indication of the target that would 
allow an understanding of whether this amount is an 
adequate achievement. 
Clarity of the 
mandate 
Medium Limited information available at the website, including 
GVEP values, approaches to programs, membership of 
the board of trustees, names of partners. The roles and 
responsibilities of partners, mechanisms for appointment 
of the board of trustees are not clearly defined. 
Reporting 
 
Low Quantitative review of the progress is available only for 
the projects being implemented. Progress reports are 
based on descriptive analysis with qualitative 																																																								10	http://www.reeep.org/partners	























GVEP has two categories of partners, i.e. program and 
financial partners. Fifteen financial partners (represented 
by governments, business, IFIs and NGOs such as 
Barclays, DFID, EU, Garfield Weston Foundation, OFID, 
Sida, USAID, Vitol Foundation, World Bank, EEP Africa, 
Rotary Club, UN Foundation, ENERGIA) provide funds, 
which are further disbursed by GVEP to support projects 
implemented by 15 program partners (represented by 
private firms and NGOs such as National Geographic, 
Invested Development, Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund 
(AECF), Ashden, BiD Network, GIZ, Hedon, Heifer 
International, Energia/ETC International, Solar Sister, 
Climate Innovation Centre Kenya, GSMA, Kiva, SEM 
Fund, Toniic).11. Decisions about organisation and 
program development are done by the Board of 
Trustees, which consists of 9 members none of which 







Mechanism for public consultation is not available 
 
WWEA 
Goal attainment Low Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers 
concluding on the goal attainment.  
Clarity of the 
mandate 
Medium  No evidence of statute document has been found, role 
and membership of the working groups, procedures for 
becoming a partner. Little information available about 
organisational structure, roles and responsibilities of the 





Low Progress reports include description of the events and 
activities undertaken. Quantitative reviews are made on 







Partners are not engaged in decision-making. WWEA has 
280 members from 75 countries; mainly, national 
associations, scientific institutes and companies. WWEA 
reaches its partners through informing, organisation of 
the World Wind Energy Conferences and publication of 
the bulletins. WWEA governing board consists of 11 




Low Mechanism for public consultation is not available 
 
REN21 
Goal attainment Low Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers 
concluding on the goal attainment. 
Clarity of the 
mandate 
High Information regarding organisational structure, role  and 
function of the General Assembly, steering committee, 
contributors, code of conduct and membership is 
available in REN21 Statutes. 
Reporting 
 
Low Progress reports are based on descriptive analysis with 
qualitative assessments that are subjective and difficult 
to verify. Available quantitative estimates relate to the 
number of the visits of the webpage, downloads, extent 







REN21 network consists of 4 R&D companies, 9 
governmental organisations, 13 NGOs, 11 industry 
associations and 10 international organisations. REN 21 
has the most inclusive governing system in place, which 
is represented by the multi-stakeholder Steering 
Committee. The Committee is composed of up to 50 
members who reflect the membership base and are 
composed of the relevant actors from national 
governments, international organisations, industry 
associations, academia and NGOs. Futhermore, REN21 
has a mechanism of General Assembly, which facilitated 
interaction among all the partnership members through 
regular meetings and information exchange 
Public 
consultations 
Low Mechanism for public consultation is not available 
 
Institutionally set partnerships demonstrate low levels of instrumental effectiveness due 
to uncertain contributions to reduction of GHGs emissions, however, this conclusion could be 
adjusted if taking into account the broader consequences and attainment of the goals specific 
to each partnerships.  
 In terms of institutional effectiveness, institutionally set partnerships demonstrate low 
to medium levels of accountability due to weak reporting and not explicitly clear mandate (in 
case of WWEA and GVEP). The regime effectiveness is low on average with the exception of 
REN21 which shows medium values due to a high degree of partner inclusiveness in decision-
making.  
3.3 UNFCCC regime as a partnership 
UNFCCC is aiming at creation of an enabling environment and rule setting within the 
issue area. The relationship and roles of partners are strictly regulated. UNFCCC regime as a 
partnership can be characterised as a closed institution with high fragmentation, extensive 
number of partners involved, substantial scope and operations and global level. Similarly to 
CDM, the partnership operates in a highly regulated task-environment and role of partners 
are strictly set, but in contrast collaborations are continuous in time and include an extensive 
number of actors. 
UNFCCC 
Indicator Value Explanation 
Goal attainment Low Inability to meet initial 5% target (non-ratification of 
the USA and withdrawal of Canada. (Morel and 
Shishlov, 2014) and adopting long-term post-Kyoto 
targets (Bäckstrand, 2007), 
Clarity of the 
mandate 
High Clearly defined in corresponding frameworks such as 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol etc 
Reporting 
 
High  The procedures and standards for reporting, monitoring 
and evaluation are strictly set. Article 5 of the Kyoto 
protocol commits Annex I Parties to having, national 
systems for the estimation of greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with agreed methodologies. Article 7 
requires Annex I Parties to submit annual greenhouse 
gas inventories, as well as national communications, at 
regular intervals, both including supplementary 
information to demonstrate compliance with the 
Protocol. Article 8 establishes that expert review teams 
will review the inventories, and national 








Characterised by unequal access to decision making. 
Governments are in charge of enforcing and making 
the rules, while civil society, academia and business are 
engaged as observers. (Bäckstrand, 2007) 
As stipulated in Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC: Any body or 
agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified 
in matters covered by the Convention, and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented 
at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an 
observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third 
of the Parties present object.  According to 
Handbook13, currently more than 750 NGOs are 
admitted as observers. Business type of non-
governmental actors are engaged through consultation 
and provision of oversight to validation and verification 
of the regime mechanisms (established by Kyoto 
Protocol Duyck, 2011). 
																																																								13	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook. Bonn, Germany: 
Climate Change Secretariat 	
Public 
consultations 
Medium According to E3G report, UNFCCC offers limited 
opportunities for citizen empowerment and 
participation of civil society. There is no standard 
process for consultation with public sector, however 
several civil society initiatives have been set up to 
monitor progress and outcomes and to act as observers 
to this process. e.g. AidData, International Aid 
Transparency Initiative. 
 
Partnership of climate change regime does not prove to be efficient “instrument” for 
achieving the targeted emissions reductions necessary for preventing adverse effects of 
climate change. Climate regime has high levels of institutional effectiveness and low to 
medium levels of regime effectiveness, due to limited opportunities for stakeholder 
engagement in decision making and involvement of civil society.  
4. Discussion 
CDM partnerships demonstrates the highest ranks of effectiveness as instrument and 
institution, however they have the weakest partnership identity in terms of project-based 
structure based on limited number of short-term contacts with the companies and 
organisations. Despite lacking the element of joint decision making, partnerships contribute 
to citizen empowerment with established Global Stakeholder Process, which results in low to 
medium value of regime effectiveness (Table 4). 
Type of effectiveness Instrumental Institutional Regime 
CDM High High Low to medium 
REEEP, GVEP etc Low Low to Medium Low to medium 
UNFCCC  Low High  Low to medium 
 
Table 4. Cross-comparison of effectiveness across three modalities of climate partnerships 
Institutionally set partnerships have the low ranking within instrumental effectiveness. 
Low values of instrumental effectiveness could be explained by lack of accountability in terms 
of GHG reductions among this type of partnerships. However this modality provide valuable 
input and attain (alternative to GHG reductions) goals through knowledge exchange, capacity 
building and institutionalising the issues that are not explicitly addressed within the climate 
regime (e.g. contribution to climate change via development of SME in case of GVEP, 
alternative business models in case of REEEP). Consideration of broader outcomes is 
necessary for concluding on instrumental effectiveness of this modality, but it is lacking 
quantitative methodologies (Walteer and Zurn, 2004) as there is a time lag between the 
activities and a change (Dombrovsky, 2008)) and high uncertainty and costs involved in 
calculation of such emissions reductions. Surprisingly, this modality shows the lowest rank in 
terms of institutional effectiveness and is surpassed by CDM and regime partnerships. Despite 
having clear mandates and structures, on average this modality has weak reporting and 
approaches to M&E, which result in low to medium value under institutional type of 
effectiveness. In terms of regime effectiveness, this modality demonstrates a similar low to 
medium value result to climate regime and CDM partnerships, which is explained by lack of 
participatory opportunities for partners and civil society. 
Finally, climate regime proves to be an inefficient instrument and efficient institution, 
which results in second rank in terms of contribution to tackling climate issues through three 
types of effectiveness.  
The variations in effectiveness are observed within institutional and instrumental 
categories. Variations in goal attainment could be possibly explained by the specialisation and 
scope of the problem, i.e. the smaller the scale, amount of the resources and partners 
involved the more efficient the partnership is. Variations in accountability could be related to 
degree of regulation of the task environment (Table 1). Institutionally set partnerships 
operate in considerably less regulated environment that is characterised by lack of standards 
for reporting and M&E. Hence the lower degree of regulation the lower level of accountability. 
However more detailed tendency analysis is needed for finding causal relationship between 
each independent variables of each modality of partnerships (such as structure and scope) 
and effectiveness values.  
5. Conclusion 
Understanding partnership effectiveness is a complex issue, which relies on various 
assessment methods and approaches. An additional challenge relates to diversity of 
partnerships, which demonstrate significant variations in term of structure, scope of work, 
degree of institutionalisations and means through which they contribute to environmental 
governance. Different standards of effectiveness should be established to address these 
variations and allow for the comparative assessment of effectiveness. 
The study determines the adequate definition of effectiveness for each modality and 
proposes a set of indicators for each type category of effectiveness standard. In such a way 
three analytical perspectives for assessing effectiveness have been developed and applied to 
each partnership modality specialising in climate change. Furthermore, each climate change 
partnership’s modality is assessed against three standards of effectiveness. As a result of 
assessment, CDM partnerships appear to be the most effective based on their total 
contribution against the three effectiveness standards, while institutionally set partnerships 
are the least effective for tackling climate change issues.  
The proposed evaluation framework relies on a limited number of indicators and delivers a 
reductionistic conclusion, which has an illustrative purpose to demonstrate variations of 
partnership effectiveness depending on the analytical outlook. The more explicit conclusion 
could be made on the basis of large-n studies using comprehensive evaluation framework 
addressing other aspects of partnership contribution, such as transparency, adaptivity, 
innovation etc.  
Furthermore, a detailed tendency analysis could be developed in order to detect the areas 
of partnerships specialisation and understand how the advantages of each modality could be 
used more effectively for the perspective of climate governance.  
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